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1 Introduction
Consider a potential traveler who is planning to buy a plane ticket in advance. However, at
this moment, he is not certain whether he will travel. Let his valuation for traveling be v.
If the airline offers him a refundable ticket now, he will be willing to pay v for that ticket.
But if the airline offers him a non-refundable ticket, his willingness to pay should be less
than v.1 Once he knows with certainty whether he wants to travel, there is no reason why
he should be willing to pay more for a refundable ticket than for a non-refundable ticket.
This paper presents a theory that explains how a monopolist can use refundable and
non-refundable tickets to screen consumers and extract more surplus when consumers have
to select a contract before knowing their demand with certainty.2 In the simple two-period
model, the airline will offer both ticket types in advance to consumers who are uncertain
about their demand and have different willingness to pay. We derive optimal refundable
and non-refundable fares that depend on each consumer’s willingness to pay and the prob-
ability of travel. Consumers with high willingness to pay buy refundable tickets, and con-
sumers with low willingness to pay buy non-refundable tickets. Furthermore, we find that
the difference between these two fares consists of a quality component—the refundability
value—and a price-discrimination component. A comparative-statics analysis provides an
empirical implication of the model: the gap between the two fares diminishes as the date
of departure approaches and consumers become more certain about their individual de-
mand. Therefore, the airline’s ability to separate consumer types and to price discriminate
vanishes.
In the empirical section we test the main empirical implication from the theory. We
collected from the online travel agency Expedia.com an original panel data set of refund-
able fares, non-refundable fares, and seat inventories across 96 U.S. domestic monopoly
routes at various days prior to the departure date. The data collection focuses on posted
one-way economy-class fares to control for price differentials associated with other ticket
1This ex-ante willingness to pay for a non-refundable ticket is analogous to the option price in Cicchetti
and Freeman (1971). Schmalensee (1972) and Graham (1981) show that the option price may be greater or
smaller than the expected willingness to pay.
2Even though we focus on airlines, the results can also be applied to other industries where goods are
sold in advance with a refundable option, such as cruises, car rentals, and lodging.
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restrictions; for example, Saturday-night stayover, minimum and maximum stay, first-class
travel, and connecting legs. These restrictions are commonly used as ‘fences’ to implement
other forms of price discrimination and congestion pricing and to deal with aggregate de-
mand uncertainty. The panel structure of the data controls for unobservable time-invariant
carrier-, route-, and flight-specific characteristics. Moreover, the fact that both fares were
collected at the same time for the same seat allows us to control for unobserved time-variant
seat-specific characteristics. The estimation method, which takes into account the dynamic
adjustment between the difference in fares and seat inventories, shows strong evidence that
price discrimination through refund contracts vanishes as the departure date nears. In
addition, a nonparametric specification indicates that most of the individual demand un-
certainty, as implied by the carriers’ pricing strategy, is resolved during the last two weeks
prior to the departure date.3
In the literature, Gale and Holmes (1993) and Dana (1998) use advanced-purchase
discounts as a means of price discrimination to improve capacity utilization in monopolistic
and competitive markets respectively. In contrast, we show that an airline monopoly can
use a refundability option to screen consumers and increase the airline’s expected profit.
Courty and Li (2000) suggest a theoretical model for a monopolist that price discriminates
via refund contracts consisting of a price a buyer has to pay in advance and a refund the
buyer can receive after he learns his valuation of the good. While Courty and Li’s purpose
is to find an optimal refund contract consisting of an advance payment and a refundable
amount, our goal is to find an optimal contract consisting of a non-refundable price and a
refundable price for each type. In a related work, Akan et al. (2011) present a generalization
of Courty and Li (2000) with consumers who learn their valuations gradually and with a
seller that can vary the length of time during which the tickets are refundable. Bilotkach
(2009) presents a model explaining refund contracts under costly capacity and demand
uncertainty.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model,
3There are many ways that uncertainty could be resolved. In this paper, by resolved uncertainty, we
mean an increase in the probability that a ticket holder wants to travel on a particular date as the trip
date nears. These results, in addition, help explain the large price dispersion in airlines documented in
Borenstein and Rose (1994) and more recently in Gerardi and Shapiro (2009).
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including the consumer’s problem and the airline’s problem, and describes the airline’s
price menu in equilibrium. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis by first describing the
data, then setting the empirical model, and closing with the results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical Analysis
Consider a monopolistic airline that sells homogeneous seats on a flight to consumers whose
type, high (H) or low (L), is not observable to the airline. In airline markets, it is common
to see consumers buy tickets in advance despite uncertainty in their travel plans. In our
two-period model, consumers have unit demands and have to decide whether to buy a
ticket in period 1. However, they learn in period 2 whether they want to fly or not (i.e.,
demand equals 1 or 0). Let travel and no travel be mutually exclusive states of nature in
which a consumer wants and does not want to travel respectively. The risk in the state
of nature that each consumer faces is an individual risk that is independent from those of
other consumers. For θ = H,L, we let piθ denote the probability that type θ consumer
wants to travel and hence 1−piθ the probability that the consumer does not want to travel.
Both types have a positive valuation of traveling vθ and share the same utility function u
with u′ > 0 and u′′ ≤ 0. We normalize u so that u(0) = 0.
2.1 The Consumer’s Problem
In period 1, the airline offers refundable and non-refundable tickets to all consumers. If a
type θ consumer buys a refundable ticket at price p in period 1 and learns that he wants to
travel in period 2, then he will use the ticket and his utility will be u(vθ − p). If he learns
that he does not want to travel, he will request a refund and his utility will be his status
quo, u(0), which is equal to zero. In contrast, if the consumer buys a non-refundable ticket
at price p, his utility will be u(vθ − p) if he wants to travel and u(−p) otherwise. Under
expected utility theory, type θ consumer’s expected utility from buying a refundable ticket
at price p is denoted by
U rθ (p) = piθu(vθ − p) (1)
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and type θ consumer’s expected utility from buying a non-refundable ticket at price p is
denoted by
Unrθ (p) = piθu(vθ − p) + (1− piθ)u(−p). (2)
Note that there is no time value of money. If a consumer does not buy a ticket, his
utility in period 2 will be zero in both states.4 Then type θ’s reservation price for a
refundable ticket is vθ and type θ’s reservation price for a non-refundable ticket is cθ such
that Unrθ (cθ) = 0; i.e.,
piθu(vθ − cθ) + (1− piθ)u(−cθ) = 0. (3)
Note that cθ is an increasing continuous function of piθ from [0, 1] onto [0, vθ].
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Now we explain how a consumer decides which type of ticket to buy when the airline
simultaneously offers non-refundable and refundable tickets in period 1. Formally, let the
airline offer a price menu (pnr, pr) in which pnr represents a non-refundable price and pr
represents a refundable price. Each consumer’s action set includes buy a refundable ticket,
buy a non-refundable ticket, and not buy a ticket. We find that type θ consumers best
response is given by:
(i) buy a refundable ticket if U rθ (p
r) ≥ Unrθ (pnr) and U rθ (pr) ≥ 0,
(ii) buy a non-refundable ticket if Unrθ (p
nr) > U rθ (p
r) and Unrθ (p
nr) ≥ 0,
(iii) buy no ticket if Unrθ (p
nr) < 0 and U rθ (p
r) < 0.
2.2 The Airline’s Problem
We now turn to the airline’s pricing problem. In particular, we are interested in a separating
equilibrium where type H consumers buy refundable tickets and type L consumers buy
non-refundable tickets. We solve for the optimal separating price menu and show that it
constitutes an equilibrium under reasonable conditions.
Let the numbers of type H and type L consumers in period 1 be NH and NL and the
expected numbers of type H and type L consumers that want to travel in period 2 be
4It is possible to extend the model by imposing a cost on the consumer who wants to travel but does not
have a ticket so that his utility is lower than zero. However, the differences in the results are immaterial.
5For example, if u(x) = ln(1 + x/1000), vL = 500, and piL = 0.6, then we find that cL = 268.
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nH = piHNH and nL = piLNL respectively. The airline, which has zero marginal cost and
a capacity at least nH + nL, announces p
nr and pr at the beginning of period 1. Since
the airline does not know each consumer’s type, we let the airline derive its belief about
each consumer type from NH and NL. After observing the prices, consumers’ strategies
could be either pooling (i.e., both types choose the same action) or separating (i.e., each
type chooses a different action). We define an equilibrium as a combination of the airline’s
beliefs and strategy (pnr, pr) and each consumer’s strategy given θ and (pnr, pr) so that the
airline’s expected profit and each consumer’s expected utility are maximized.
We are interested in separating equilibria in which each consumer type buys a different
type of ticket. However, we cannot identify which consumer type buys which type of
ticket without further assumptions about vθ and piθ for θ = H,L. Thus we assume negative
correlation between valuation and certainty about travel (i.e., vH > vL and piH < piL). This
is a realistic assumption because most business travelers have a higher willingness to pay
for a ticket and are less certain about their travel than pleasure travelers. As a result, type
H consumers buy refundable tickets, type L consumers buy non-refundable tickets, and the
airline’s expected profit is equal to NLp
nr + nHp
r. Given these consumers’ strategies, we
solve for the airline’s optimal price menu below and present the solution in Proposition 1.
Nonetheless, this separating price menu does not always constitute an equilibrium because
it may be possible for the airline to increase expected profit by using an alternative price
menu inducing other responses from the consumers. We provide necessary and sufficient
conditions for existence of this separating equilibrium in Proposition 2.
The airline’s optimization problem can be written as:
max
pnr,pr
NLp
nr + nHp
r (4)
s.t.
U rH(p
r) ≥ UnrH (pnr) (5)
UnrL (p
nr) ≥ UnrL (pr) (6)
U rH(p
r) ≥ 0 (7)
UnrL (p
nr) ≥ 0. (8)
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The incentive-compatibility constraints, (5) and (6), are required for type H consumers to
prefer buying a refundable ticket and type L consumers to prefer buying a non-refundable
ticket, while the participation constraints, (7) and (8), are required for both consumer types
to buy a ticket. There are two possibilities: either cL ≥ cH or cL < cH . If cL ≥ cH , type
L consumers are willing to pay more for a non-refundable ticket while type H consumers
are willing to pay more for a refundable ticket. It follows that the airline can separate the
consumers by simply setting (pnr, pr) = (cL, vH).
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Now consider the case where type L consumers are willing to pay less for a non-
refundable ticket than type H consumers (i.e., cL < cH). If the airline sets (p
nr, pr) =
(cL, vH), type H consumers will find non-refundable tickets more attractive than refund-
able tickets because U rH(vH) < U
nr
H (cL). To obtain the separating equilibrium, the airline
must lower the refundable price to be no larger than m so that U rH(m) = U
nr
H (cL). That
is,
piHu(vH −m) = piHu(vH − cL) + (1− piH)u(−cL). (9)
We say that the difference between vH and m is the information rent taken by type
H consumers. The airline offers this discount to prevent type H consumers from buying
a non-refundable ticket. In this case the solution is (pnr, pr) = (cL,m).
7 We summarize
these results in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Given the following assumptions:
(i) vH > vL > 0.
(ii) 0 < piH < piL < 1.
(iii) u′ > 0 and u′′ ≤ 0.
6For example, let u(x) = ln(1 + x/1000). For type L consumers, vL = 500 and piL = 0.6, so cL = 268.
For type H consumers, vH = 800 and piH = 0.3, so cH = 185. Since cL ≥ cH , the airline sets (pnr, pr) =
(268, 800).
7Let u(x) = ln(1 + x/1000). For type L consumers, vL = 500 and piL = 0.6, so cL = 268. For type H
consumers, vH = 800 and piH = 0.5, so cH = 323. We find that m = 678. Since cL < cH , the airline sets
(pnr, pr) = (268, 678).
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The airline’s optimal price menu so that type L consumers buy non-refundable tickets and
type H consumers buy refundable tickets is given by
(pnr, pr) =

(cL, vH) if cL ≥ cH
(cL,m) if cL < cH
(10)
where cθ and m are defined in (3) and (9) respectively.
Proof See the above argument.
Given the separating response in which type L consumers buy non-refundable tickets
and type H consumers buy refundable tickets, the airline maximizes its profit by always
selling non-refundable tickets at cL. If a type L consumer is willing to pay more for a non-
refundable ticket than a type H consumer (i.e., cL ≥ cH) then the type H consumer will
find a refundable ticket priced at vH more attractive than a non-refundable ticket. Despite
the fact that a non-refundable ticket costs less, it gives a type H consumer lower expected
utility than a refundable ticket. Hence the optimal pricing menu is (pnr, pr) = (cL, vH). In
contrast, if a type H consumer is willing to pay more for a non-refundable ticket than a type
L consumer (i.e., cH > cL) he will find a non-refundable ticket priced at cL more attractive
than a refundable ticket priced at vH . So the airline has to lower the refundable price to
m so that the expected utilities from both ticket types are equal, and by our tie-breaking
rule, he will buy a refundable ticket.
Even though the airline sells tickets to the two consumer types at different prices, we
cannot claim that the difference between the two prices, pr − pnr, is solely due to price
discrimination because the two ticket types have different qualities. We decompose the
fare difference into two components: pr−vL and vL−pnr. The second component, which is
equal to vL− cL, is the refundability value to type L consumers because it is the difference
in willingness to pay for a refundable ticket versus a non-refundable ticket. If cL ≥ cH , the
first component equals the difference in willingness to pay for a refundable ticket between
the two consumer types. Since the airline can sell refundable tickets to type H consumers at
a higher price than what type L consumers are willing to pay, we say that this component
is the airline’s price discrimination. If cL < cH , the price discrimination component is
smaller because the airline has to lower the refundable price to separate consumers.
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2.3 Equilibrium Prices
We have shown in Proposition 1 that the airline’s optimal price menu conditional on ob-
taining a separating equilibrium in which type H consumers buy refundable tickets and
type L consumers buy non-refundable tickets is (pnr, pr) = (cL, vH) if cL ≥ cH and
(pnr, pr) = (cL,m) if cL < cH . However, this separating response may not be best to
the airline and hence the described price menu may not constitute an equilibrium. For
instance, if there are only a few type H consumers, a pooling response in which all con-
sumers buy refundable tickets may be more profitable. We provide necessary and sufficient
conditions for the airline to find the separating response most profitable in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 Given the following assumptions:
(i) vH > vL > 0.
(ii) 0 < piH < piL < 1.
(iii) u′ > 0 and u′′ ≤ 0.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of an equilibrium where type L consumers
buy non-refundable tickets and type H consumers buy refundable tickets are
NH
NL
≥ piLvL − cL
piH(vH − vL) (11)
if cL ≥ cH and
piLvL − cL
piH(m− vL) ≤
NH
NL
≤ cL
piH(vH −m) (12)
if cL < cH , where cθ and m are defined in (3) and (9) respectively.
Proof See Appendix.
To assure that the separating response where the airline sells refundable tickets to type
H consumers and non-refundable tickets to type L consumers constitutes an equilibrium,
we must show that the airline’s maximum profit given this response is not lower than its
maximum profit from each of other consumers’ responses.8 The inequality in (11) and the
8In the proof of Proposition 2, we compare the airline’s profit from the optimal price menu in (10) to
profits from other optimal price menus given other consumers’ responses.
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left inequality in (12) guarantee that the separating price menu from (10) yields a higher
profit than the optimal price menu conditional on obtaining a pooling equilibrium with
both types buying refundable tickets. Both inequalities suggest that NH/NL must be large
enough because the airline makes more profit from type H and less profit from type L with
the separating price menu. To maximize its profit while making both type H and type L
consumers buy refundable tickets, the airline must set pnr really high so that no one would
want to buy a non-refundable ticket. With this pooling price, the airline makes less profit
from type H consumers because it has to lower pr to vL so that refundable tickets attract
all consumers. However, the airline makes more profit from type L consumers by selling
them refundable instead of non-refundable tickets because of risk aversion. We show in the
appendix that cL ≤ piLvL whenever u′′ ≤ 0 and hence the profit from selling non-refundable
tickets to type L consumers, NLcL, is smaller than NLpiLvL which is the airline’s profit
when selling them refundable tickets.9
In addition to pooling-on-refundable response described above, we also consider other
consumers’ responses in the proof of Proposition 2 and find that the separating price menu
dominates all other responses regardless of NH and NL when cL ≥ cH . However, when
cL < cH , another candidate of equilibrium arises because the airline might prefer selling
only refundable tickets to type H consumers and no tickets at all to type L consumers.
Remember that the optimal separating price menu given cL < cH is (p
nr, pr) = (cL,m).
Since the airline sells refundable tickets at a discounted price, m, it may be more profitable
to the airline, when NH is large enough, to set p
nr very high so that a non-refundable ticket
is unattractive to everyone and increase pr to vH .
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In short, the separating price menu in (10) constitute an equilibrium when the propor-
tion of type H to type L population is neither too large nor too small. If there are relatively
9Consider the example in Footnote 5. If NH = NL = 50, the separating price menu yields (15× 800) +
(50 × 268) = 25, 400 in profit which is greater than profit from the pooling-on-refundable price menu,
(15 × 500) + (30 × 500) = 22, 500. If the NH/NL ratio was not large enough, say NH = 10 and NL = 90,
the airline would try to sell refundable tickets to all consumers and make (3× 500) + (54× 500) = 28, 500
in profit instead of (3× 800) + (90× 268) = 26, 520 from separating.
10Following with the example in Footnote 8, with NH = 90 and NL = 10. The separating price menu
yields (45 × 678) + (10 × 268) = 33, 190 in profit which is smaller than profit from selling only refundable
tickets to type H, 45× 800 = 36, 000.
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many type L consumers, the airline will prefer selling refundable tickets to both types at
vL. On the other hand, if there are relatively many type H consumers and the willingness
to pay for a non-refundable ticket of type L is less than that of type H, the airline will
prefer selling only refundable tickets to type H at vH and no tickets at all to type L.
The restrictions (11) and (12) can be simplified when consumers are risk neutral because,
as we see from (3), cL = piLvL when u
′′ = 0, and as a result, the inequality in (11) and
the left inequality in (12) are automatically satisfied. So we can say that when consumers
are risk neutral and cL ≥ cH , the airline’s separating price menu given in Proposition 1
always constitutes an equilibrium. In contrast, if cL < cH , we still need to impose the right
inequality of (12) even when u′′ = 0. Nonetheless, we can say that it is very likely to see
the separating price menu in equilibrium if consumers are slightly risk averse because both
restrictions on NH/NL are easier to satisfy.
2.4 Empirical Implication
We now provide an interesting empirical implication from this theoretical model: the gap
between refundable and non-refundable prices diminishes as the flight date nears and the
consumers become more certain about their travel plans. Let piH and piL be continuous
functions of τ , the time length between period 1 and period 2 in the theoretical model (i.e.,
the number of days between when agents consider buying a ticket and the departure date).
We assume the following:
(i) piL(τ) and piH(τ) are non-increasing in τ .
(ii) piL(τ) ≥ piH(τ) for all τ .
(iii) piL(0) = piH(0) = 1.
The possibility that each passenger becomes more certain about traveling because he
may have more information as the departure date approaches can justify (i). Conditions
(ii) and (iii) mean that type L travelers are more certain about traveling than type H
travelers on any day prior to departure and that there is no uncertainty about traveling
on the departure date. These are practical conditions because most business travelers are
more uncertain about their travel than pleasure travelers when they buy tickets in advance,
and all agents know with certainty whether they are flying on the departure date.
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We learn from (3) that cθ is a continuous function of piθ and that dcθ/dpiθ > 0. It follows
from the above assumptions that when τ is small (i.e., close to departure date) both piL and
piH will be close to 1 and, as a result, cL < cH . In contrast, when τ is large, it is possible
that the difference between piL and piH is so large that cL ≥ cH . We show below that
regardless of whether cL ≥ cH or cL < cH the gap between refundable and non-refundable
prices are smaller as τ decreases.
If cL ≥ cH , the airline sets (pnr, pr) = (cL, vH). Since piL increases as τ decreases, we
find from (3) that cL also increases and the gap between p
r and pnr becomes smaller. On
days close to departure, piH will be large enough that cH > cL and the airline sets (p
nr, pr) =
(cL,m). From (9) we find that, as piH approaches 1, m converges to cL. Therefore, the
difference between the refundable and non-refundable fares diminishes as the departure date
approaches (i.e., τ → 0). When τ = 0, the airline sets (pnr, pr) = (cL, cL) = (vL, vL).11
There is only one price on the departure date because there is no benefit from paying more
for a refundable ticket when individual demand uncertainty is fully resolved. The airline’s
ability to screen consumers vanishes, making price discrimination opportunities through
refund contracts disappear.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data
We collected from the online travel agency Expedia.com the lowest posted refundable and
non-refundable one-way economy-class fares for 96 flights that departed on June 22, 2006.
Following Stavins (2001) we focused on a single day, Thursday, to control for price differen-
tials associated with systematic peak-load pricing over days of the week. The data form a
panel with 96 cross-sectional units observed over 28 periods. Each cross-section corresponds
to a specific carrier’s non-stop flight between a city pair. Fares were recorded every three
days, from 82 days prior to departure to one day prior to departure, i.e., τ = 1, 4, 7, . . . , 82.
The carriers considered are American, Alaska, Continental, Delta, United, and US Airways.
11As the date of travel approaches the model allows for the possibility that we move from the separating
equilibrium to other equilibria. This will not be an issue if NH and NL satisfy the conditions in Proposition
2 for all τ .
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The share of each carriers’ flights in the data set was chosen to be close to the carrier’s
share of the U.S. market.
A monopoly route, as defined by Borenstein and Rose (1994), is a route on which
a single carrier operates more than 90 percent of the weekly direct flights. Following a
similar but stricter criterion, each of our 96 monopoly routes is operated by a carrier who
is the sole supplier of non-stop service between the city pair. Tickets with one or more
stops and first-class travel tickets are considered to be of significantly different quality.
By picking non-stop flights and one-way fares we control for price differences associated
with different ticket restrictions, cost differences associated with round-trip tickets, and
price variations related to more sophisticated itineraries. Dealing with one-way tickets is
particularly important in our model because the traveler may also be uncertain about the
return portion in a round-trip ticket.
[Insert Figure 1 here.]
Figure 1 shows the average refundable and non-refundable fares across all 96 monopoly
routes at different points prior to the departure date. The dashed lines are 95% confidence
intervals for the means and are calculated separately for every point in time using the
t-distribution. The figure shows that there is a strong tendency for non-refundable fares
to increase faster than refundable fares, suggesting that as the flight date nears consumers
resolve their individual demand uncertainty.
3.2 Main Result
The panel structure of the data allows us to control for time-invariant flight-, carrier-,
and route-specific characteristics. This includes all time-invariant characteristics in Stavins
(2001), who used a cross section of tickets. However, there are time-variant cost components
that arise at seat-level. Stochastic peak-load pricing, as explained in Borenstein and Rose
(1994), depends on the degree of price adjustment as demand is revealed over time. Prices
on the same flight can vary with the purchase date and with the probability, at the time the
ticket is sold, that demand will exceed capacity. In models of aggregate demand uncertainty
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where sellers commit to a price schedule, Dana (1998, 1999) considers the existence of an
effective cost of capacity, which also changes across seats.
To control for these time-variant seat-specific characteristics, we take advantage of the
fact that both refundable and non-refundable fares were obtained at the same time for
the same seat. Hence, taking the difference between these two fares will wipe out these
characteristics.12 The basic logarithmic specification of the reduced-form model that we
estimate is given by
ln(prijt − pnrijt) =
∑
s=4,7,...,82
βsI
[τt=s]
t +X
′
ijtδ + νij + εijt, (13)
where the subscript i refers to flight, j to route, and t to time. Following the theoretical
section, pr and pnr are the refundable and non-refundable ticket prices, and τ is the number
of days prior to departure when the two prices were recorded. The indicator variables I
[τt=s]
t
are each equal to one at different number of days to departure, i.e., τ = 4, 7, . . . , or 82.
Because I
[τ=1]
t is the omitted category, βτ captures the logarithm of the difference in the
price gap between τ days and 1 day to departure. X ′ijt is a vector of controls that includes
the lagged dependent variable and the load factor (LOAD), defined as the ratio of occupied
seats to total seats.13 Finally, νij denotes the unobservable flight-specific effect and εijt
denotes the remaining disturbance.
[Insert Table 1 here.]
From the summary statistics presented in Table 1, we find that refundable fares are,
on average, 51% larger than non-refundable fares. As expected, variation in fares across
flights is very close for both fare types, but non-refundable fares appear to have more
within-flight variation than do refundable fares. Table 2 presents the estimates of the
12Controlling for these costs has limited the availability of empirical papers on airline price discrimination.
Stavins (2001) looks at price differentials due to ticket restrictions; however, those ticket restrictions are
understood to solve the peak-load pricing problem as well (see Courty and Li, 2000, p. 716).
13Given that overbookings are usually a small fraction of the total number of tickets, LOAD is assumed
to be proportional to bookings. LOAD was obtained from the seat-availability map, where the available or
prime seats reported by Expedia.com are counted as available seats. Escobari (2009), Escobari (2012) and
Alderighi et al. (2012) explain the importance of controlling for seat availability.
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coefficients of Equation 13. All columns are estimated using flight fixed effects to control
for route-, carrier-, and flight-specific characteristics. As robustness checks, the second
column controls for capacity utilization using LOAD, while the third column includes
LOAD and the lagged dependent variable. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics
based on cluster-robust standard errors, clustered by airline. Column 1 shows that at a
1% significance level, with the exception of 4 days in advance, the price gaps are larger
than the gap from 1 day in advance. The decline in the gap appears to occur during the
last 13 or 16 days prior to departure, with statistically nonsignificant fluctuations in the
gap during earlier dates. The estimates indicate that, for example, the price difference is
211% larger when τ = 7 days and 298% larger when τ = 16 days.14 Columns 2 and 3
show that the percentage gap decline is smaller when controlling for capacity utilization
and even more so when additionally including the lagged dependent variable. We can see
that across all specifications the main result holds—the difference between refundable and
nonrefundable fares is smaller closer to departure.
[Insert Table 2 here.]
As a robustness analysis we also use the difference and system GMM methods proposed
in Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and
Blundell and Bond (1998) to estimate
ln(prijt − pnrijt) =
3∑
s=1
γsτ
3
t +X
′
ijtδ + νij + εijt. (14)
We model the lagged dependent variable and LOAD in X ′ijt as endogenous and weakly
exogenous respectively. A weakly exogenous LOAD means that the number of seats sold
up to time t can be affected by past realizations of the differences in fares.15
Table 3 presents the results. For comparison purposes, the first column shows the OLS
estimates of the pooled regression model. Exploiting the panel structure of the data, the
14Sweeting (2012) runs a similar specification, but of prices—not a price gap—on a set of dummies to
analyze the dynamics of prices in secondary markets for Major League Baseball tickets.
15Bilotkach et al. (2011) present a specification in which the load factor is affected by previous prices,
consistent with our assumption of weak exogeneity of LOAD. Moreover, weak exogeneity is also consistent
with Deneckere and Peck (2012) and the dynamic demand estimation in Escobari (2012).
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second column presents the within-flight regression estimates. While the signs of the day-
in-advance coefficients in both specifications are consistent with a fluctuating difference in
earlier dates and a sharp decrease in the gap close to departure, the squared and cubic
terms are not statistically significant.
The third and fourth columns report the two-step first-differenced GMM panel es-
timator as proposed in Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991). The
t-statistics in parentheses are based on the Windmeijer finite-sample correction for the
standard errors of the two-step estimates. The GMM difference panel estimator works
by taking first-differences to eliminate time-invariant characteristics and assumes that the
error term, εijt, is not serially correlated. Moreover, in this estimation the series LOADijt
may be endogenous in the sense that LOADijt is correlated with εijt and earlier shocks
but uncorrelated with εij,t+1 and subsequent shocks. Then lagged values of LOADijt are
valid instruments in the first-differenced equation. Column 3 uses LOADij,t−2 as an in-
strument, while column 4 uses LOADij,t−3 and earlier lags as instruments.16 To deal with
the problem that the new error term, εijt− εij,t−1, is correlated with the lagged dependent
variable, ln(prij,t−2 − pnrij,t−2) is also used as an instrument. To address the validity of the
specifications, columns 3 and 4 also report two tests. To test the hypothesis that the error
term, εijt, is not serially correlated, we test whether the differenced error term is second-
order serially correlated. The p-values reported for the serial correlation test provide strong
support for a valid specification. To test the overall validity of the instruments, we provide
a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions. The validity of lagged levels dated t − 2 as
instruments in column 3 is rejected. However, it is not rejected for lagged levels dated t−3
(and earlier) as instruments.
[Insert Table 3 here.]
Blundell and Bond (1998) point out that, when the explanatory variables are persistent
over time, lagged levels of these variables are weak instruments for the regression equation
in differences. To reduce the potential bias and imprecision of the difference estimator,
16τt, τ
2
t , and τ
3
t are treated as strictly exogenous across all specifications.
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we use the system estimator as suggested in Blundell and Bond (1998). Usual weak-
instrument tests cannot be implemented in these GMM specifications, so we use the known
bias in the difference GMM by comparing its sample performance with the pooled OLS
and within-group estimators, which have known properties in dynamic panel data, and
see if the system GMM improves the precision of the estimates. This system estimator
combines the regression in differences with the regression in levels. The instruments for the
regression in levels are the lagged differences of the corresponding variables. The validity
of the instruments relies on an additional assumption: There is no correlation between the
differences of LOAD and the flight-specific effects, but there may be correlation between
the levels of LOAD and the flight-specific effects. Columns 5 and 6 in Table 3 report the
two-step system GMM estimator, with the figures in parentheses being t-statistics based in
the Windmeijer robust estimator. The serial-correlation test shows strong support for the
assumption of no serial correlation, and the Sargan provides strong support for the validity
of the instrument list. In addition, the difference Sargan that tests for the additional
moment conditions used in the levels equations accepts their validity. We find that the
coefficients on τt, τ
2
t , and τ
3
t are statistically significant in all GMM specifications and that
the signs are consistent with a quick decline in the gap close to departure.
[Insert Figure 2 here.]
Finally, our last robustness check is aimed at addressing nonlinearities in a very flexible
way by estimating a nonparametric model with fixed effects. The estimation follows the
kernel methods of Racine and Li (2004) for a mix of discrete (τ) and continuous (LOAD)
data types.17 This approach allows for interactions between τ and LOAD and for nonlin-
earities in and between both. The smoothing parameters are calculated with least squares
cross-validation. The results are summarized in the partial regression plot of Figure 2,
which presents the multivariate regression function via a bivariate plot with LOAD held
constant at its median and permits a direct comparison of the parametric and nonpara-
metric results. The black dots are the nonparametric results, with the bars representing
asymptotic standard errors. The solid line is the gap profile as estimated by our preferred
17This estimator has better finite-sample properties than the popular local kernel estimator.
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specification of column 6, Table 3. Consistent with the dummy variable regression of Ta-
ble 2, there is a sharp decrease in the gap during the last two to three weeks prior to
departure. The gap between pr and pnr closes as the departure date nears and consumers
are more certain about their travel plans. While there does not seem to be much learning
during earlier dates, most of the learning takes place during the last two weeks prior to
departure.
4 Conclusions
This paper shows the importance to airlines of offering a menu of prices namely refundable
and non-refundable fares. We show that a monopolistic airline can separate consumers
who are uncertain about their demand for travel and have different willingness to pay. The
fact that individual demand uncertainty is not fully resolved by the time the individual
buys a ticket is used by the seller to price discriminate and extract more surplus. In
our model, buyers can use refund contracts to insure against uncertainty in consumption.
One implication from the theoretical model is that the gap between refundable and non-
refundable fares is a function of the individuals’ travel uncertainty. If there is no uncertainty
in individual demand, there is no difference in buying a refundable or a non-refundable
ticket, and hence there should be no difference between these two fares.
The empirical section looks at the dynamics of the price gap, refundable minus non-
refundable, in 96 monopoly routes and tests whether the individual demand uncertainty
implied by the carrier’s pricing strategy is resolved as the departure date approaches. After
controlling for unobserved time-invariant flight-, carrier-, and route-specific characteristics,
unobserved time-variant seat-specific characteristics, and potential sources of endogeneity,
the results show that the theoretical predictions are empirically supported. Second-degree
price discrimination in the form of refund contracts shrinks as the departure date nears.
Nonlinear parametric specifications and a nonparametric regression show that most of the
individual demand uncertainty is resolved during the last two weeks, when the opportunity
for price discrimination through refund contracts declines.
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Appendix
In this appendix we first prove two lemmas that we use to derive the result in Proposition
2 and then we prove the proposition.
Lemma 1 If u′′ S 0, then cθ S piθvθ.
Proof. We rewrite (3) as
−u(−cθ)
u(vθ − cθ)− u(−cθ) = piθ. (15)
We multiply both sides of (15) by vθ/cθ to obtain
−u(−cθ)/cθ
[u(vθ − cθ)− u(−cθ)]/vθ =
piθvθ
cθ
. (16)
If u′′ S 0, the left-hand side of (16) T 1 and, as a result, cθ S piθvθ.
Lemma 2 If u′′ S 0, then m T cLpiH .
Proof. We rewrite (9) as
−u(−cL)
u(vH − cL)− u(vH −m) =
piH
1− piH . (17)
We multiply both sides of (17) by (m− cL)/cL to obtain
−u(−cL)/cL
[u(vH − cL)− u(vH −m)]/(m− cL) =
piH(m− cL)
(1− piH)cL . (18)
If u′′ S 0, the left-hand side of (18) T 1 and, as a result, m T cLpiH .
Proof of Proposition 2
Since the airline cannot observe each consumer’s type, the airline may try to set prices
so that consumers either pool or separate their strategies. We summarize the consumers’
responses to the airline’s price menu as follows:
(i) Pooling 1 : The airline sells refundable tickets to both types (RB).
(ii) Pooling 2 : The airline sells non-refundable tickets to both types (NB).
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(iii) Separating 1 : The airline sells only refundable tickets to type H (RH).
(iv) Separating 2 : The airline sells only non-refundable tickets to either type H or L (NL
if cL > cH or NH if cL < cH).
(v) Separating 3 : The airline sells refundable tickets to type H and non-refundable tickets
to type L (RHNL).
We consider these responses under two cases: cL ≥ cH and cL < cH . For RB the airline
maximizes its profit by setting pnr ≥ max{cH , cL} and pr = vL in both cases. For NB the
airline sets pnr = cH if cL ≥ cH , pnr = cL if cL < cH , and pr > vH in both cases.
For RH the airline sets pnr > cL if cL ≥ cH , pnr ≥ cH if cL < cH , and pr = vH in
both cases. For NL in case cL > cH , the airline sets p
nr = cL and p
r > vH . For NH in
case cL < cH , the airline sets p
nr = cH and p
r > vH . Note that NL is not possible when
cL ≤ cH and that NH is not possible when cL ≥ cH .
For RHNL, Proposition 1 states that the airline sets pnr = cL and p
r = vH if cL ≥ cH
and pnr = cL and p
r = m if cL < cH . The airline’s profits for each response by the
consumers in the two cases are summarized in Table A-1.
[Insert Table A-1 here.]
Let Π(·) denote the airline’s maximum profit given consumer responses to the air-
line’s price menu. If cL ≥ cH we find that Π(RHNL) ≥ Π(RH) and Π(RHNL) ≥ Π(NL).
Given that u′′ ≤ 0, Lemma 1 suggests cH ≤ piHvH . Hence Π(RHNL) ≥ Π(NB). If
NH
NL
≥ piLvL−cLpiH(vH−vL) , then Π(RHNL) ≥ Π(RB).
If cL < cH Π(RH) ≥ Π(NH) because cH ≤ piHvH . Given that u′′ ≤ 0, Lemma 2 suggests
piHm ≥ cL. Hence Π(RHNL) ≥ Π(NB). If NHNL ≥
piLvL−cL
piH(m−vL) , then Π(RHNL) ≥ Π(RB). If
NH
NL
≤ cLpiH(vH−m) , then Π(RHNL) ≥ Π(RH).
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
prijt
overall 494.486 169.181 144.000 1715.310 2628
between 156.974 144.000 735.497 96
within 64.167 141.262 1474.299 27.375
pnrijt
overall 327.749 171.588 64.000 914.000 2628
between 156.654 74.107 665.786 96
within 70.204 164.642 852.249 27.375
τt 41.500 24.238 1.000 82.000 2688
LOADijt 0.591 0.241 0.038 1.000 2688
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Table 2: Regression estimates, separate day dummies
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat
I
[τt=4 days]
t 0.527 (1.575) 0.510 (1.518) -0.212 (-0.368)
I
[τt=7 days]
t 2.106*** (5.375) 2.067*** (5.361) 1.035*** (2.852)
I
[τt=10 days]
t 2.614*** (5.290) 2.523*** (5.502) 1.580*** (3.638)
I
[τt=13 days]
t 2.565*** (4.141) 2.451*** (4.297) 1.285** (2.489)
I
[τt=16 days]
t 2.977*** (4.306) 2.800*** (4.613) 1.653*** (2.989)
I
[τt=19 days]
t 3.013*** (4.190) 2.803*** (4.505) 1.672*** (2.619)
I
[τt=22 days]
t 2.999*** (5.066) 2.737*** (5.800) 1.670*** (3.748)
I
[τt=25 days]
t 2.963*** (4.708) 2.674*** (5.423) 1.550*** (3.101)
I
[τt=28 days]
t 3.036*** (4.751) 2.727*** (5.623) 1.565*** (3.031)
I
[τt=31 days]
t 3.092*** (4.903) 2.737*** (6.072) 1.615*** (3.500)
I
[τt=34 days]
t 3.124*** (5.081) 2.733*** (6.471) 1.562*** (3.425)
I
[τt=37 days]
t 3.187*** (5.081) 2.757*** (6.465) 1.654*** (3.540)
I
[τt=40 days]
t 3.069*** (4.980) 2.609*** (6.587) 1.336*** (2.678)
I
[τt=43 days]
t 3.418*** (6.369) 2.927*** (9.515) 1.711*** (4.084)
I
[τt=46 days]
t 3.325*** (6.522) 2.809*** (10.10) 1.597*** (4.079)
I
[τt=49 days]
t 3.331*** (6.698) 2.796*** (10.95) 1.532*** (3.921)
I
[τt=52 days]
t 3.442*** (7.401) 2.878*** (12.56) 1.615*** (4.517)
I
[τt=55 days]
t 3.439*** (7.441) 2.863*** (12.93) 1.636*** (4.709)
I
[τt=58 days]
t 3.392*** (7.049) 2.795*** (12.38) 1.555*** (4.545)
I
[τt=61 days]
t 3.429*** (7.006) 2.818*** (11.96) 1.667*** (5.306)
I
[τt=64 days]
t 3.291*** (5.722) 2.665*** (8.860) 1.529*** (4.352)
I
[τt=67 days]
t 3.249*** (5.028) 2.601*** (7.173) 1.466*** (3.658)
I
[τt=70 days]
t 3.257*** (4.891) 2.600*** (6.902) 1.603*** (5.278)
I
[τt=73 days]
t 2.993*** (3.390) 2.315*** (3.978) 1.320*** (2.624)
I
[τt=76 days]
t 3.003*** (3.425) 2.315*** (4.053) 1.396*** (2.856)
I
[τt=79 days]
t 2.861*** (3.194) 2.161*** (3.686) 1.204** (1.962)
I
[τt=82 days]
t 3.177*** (4.309) 2.469*** (5.897)
LOADijt -1.350** (-2.138) -0.953** (-2.221)
ln(prij,t−1 − pnrij,t−1) 0.515*** (8.332)
Observations 2,628 2,628 2,519
Within R-squared 0.312 0.319 0.492
Notes: The dependent variable is ln(prijt−pnrijt). t-statistics in parentheses based on cluster-
robust standard errors, clustered by airline; ∗∗∗p-value<0.01, ∗∗p-value<0.05, ∗p-value<0.1.
All specifications estimated with flight fixed effects.
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Table 3: Regression estimates, cubic model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Within GMM Dif GMM Dif GMM Sys GMM Sys
VARIABLES levels groups t− 2 t− 3 t− 2 t− 3
τt/102 7.970** 11.578** 10.349*** 12.423*** 11.782*** 12.043***
(2.222) (2.537) (2.610) (3.860) (6.475) (5.411)
τ2t /10
4 -17.228* -24.928* -21.435*** -25.486*** -25.525*** -26.080***
(-1.865) (-1.891) (-4.211) (-4.782) (-5.019) (-5.183)
τ3t /10
6 11.236 15.898 13.680*** 16.220*** 16.783*** 17.152***
(1.608) (1.501) (4.077) (4.389) (4.136) (4.353)
LOADijt -0.434*** -0.828** -0.068 0.102 -0.317 -0.289
(-5.578) (-2.156) (-0.026) (0.064) (-0.129) (-0.124)
ln(prij,t−1 − pnrij,t−1) 0.854*** 0.530*** 0.572*** 0.554*** 0.566*** 0.560***
(22.736) (10.772) (6.221) (6.073) (6.679) (6.168)
Serial correlation testa(p-value) 0.605 0.619 0.604 0.609
Sargan testb(p-value) 0.004 0.066 0.689 0.988
Difference Sargan testc(p-value) 1.000 1.000
Notes: The dependent variable is ln(prijt − pnrijt). Columns 2 through 6 control for carrier-, route-, and flight-specific
characteristic. t-statistics in parentheses for the OLS and the Within groups based on cluster-robust standard errors,
clustered by airline. t-statistics in parentheses for the two-step system GMM based on Windmeijer WC-robust estimator;
∗∗∗p-value<0.01, ∗∗p-value<0.05, ∗p-value<0.1. a The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression
exhibit no second-order serial correlation (valid specification). b The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not
correlated with the residuals (valid specification). c The null hypothesis is that the additional instruments t− 3 are not
correlated with the residuals (valid specification).
Table A-1: The airline’s profits given consumers’ responses
Consumers’ responses cL ≥ cH cL < cH
RB NHpiHvL +NLpiLvL NHpiHvL +NLpiLvL
NB NHcH +NLcH NHcL +NLcL
RH NHpiHvH NHpiHvH
NL NLcL n.a.
NH n.a. NHcH
RHNL NHpiHvH +NLcL NHpiHm+NLcL
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Figure 1: Average pr and pnr with 95% confidence intervals
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